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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 
Article VIII § 2 of the Utah Constitution, Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-2-2(3)(j) (1987 & Supp. 1991) and Rules 3 and 4 of the Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Did the trial court err in directing a verdict in favor of 
defendant Sharon's Cultural Educational Recreational Association 
(SCERA) when the evidence presented clearly demonstrated that 
plaintiff was either (1) defendant's employee whose remedies were 
limited by Utah's worker's compensation statute; or (2) a 
trespasser who was owed no duty by defendant except to refrain from 
willfully and intentionally injuring plaintiff. 
In reviewing a trial court's directed verdict, this Court 
" 'must examine the evidence in the light most favorable to the 
losing party, and if there is a reasonable basis in the evidence 
and in the inferences to be drawn therefrom that would support a 
judgment in favor of the losing party, the directed verdict cannot 
be sustained.'" Virginia S. v. Salt Lake Care Center, 741 P.2d 
969f 971 (Utah App. 1987) (quoting Management Comm. of Graystone 
Pines Homeowners Ass'n v. Graystone Pines, Inc., 652 P.2d 896, 898 
(Utah 1982) . ) 
The Supreme Court will generally not consider arguments raised 
for the first time on appeal especially, as is the case here, where 
this Court may have derived great benefit from the trial judge's 
views on the issue and may have been persuaded by those views or 
needs the trial court's examination to evaluate a question of fact. 
See Zions First National Bank v. National American Title Insurance, 
749 P.2d 651, 654 (Utah 1988). Further, this Court will generally 
not consider on appeal whether a plaintiff may proceed against a 
defendant on a basis not raised in the complaint where the district 
court limited its ruling to arguments raised below. See Allisen v. 
American Legion Post #134, 763 P.2d 806, 809 (Utah 1988). 
Accordingly, since plaintiff's arguments on appeal concerning (1) 
his urged "gratuitous servant" status and (2) worker's compensation 
public policy concerns were not argued below or considered by the 
trial court in reaching its conclusion, this Court should not 
consider such arguments on appeal. See Zions First National Bank, 
supra; Allisen, supra. 
Assuming that this Court determines the trial court erred in 
directing a verdict in this case, such error requires reversal only 
if the Court concludes that absent the error there is a reasonable 
likelihood of a more favorable result for the party claiming the 
same. State v. Mitchell, 779 P.2d 1116 (Utah 1989). "An error is 
harmful only if the likelihood of a different outcome is 
sufficiently high as to undermine [the appellate court's] 
confidence in the [trial court's determination]." Crookstone v. 
Fire Insurance Exchange, slip op. at P. 6, No. 880034 (filed 
June 28, 1991) (citation omitted). 
DETERMINATIVE LAW 
Other than case law, the following statutes are controlling 
and are quoted in Appendix A: 
Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-42 (Supp. 1985) 
Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-43 (Supp. 1985) 
Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-60. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case, This is an appeal from a directed 
verdict ruling that the undisputed evidence demonstrated that 
plaintiff was defendant's employee and as such was only entitled to 
remedies provided by Utah's Worker's Compensation Statute. 
B. Course and Disposition of Proceeding Below. Plaintiff 
filed suit against defendant to recover damages for what he alleged 
were injuries he sustained as a result of performing work for 
defendant, namely using a power lawn mower to cut defendant's 
lawns. Prior to trial, all defendants settled with plaintiff 
except Sharon's Cultural Educational Recreational Association 
(SCERA), the sole defendant/appellee herein. Subsequent to the 
presentation of evidence at trial, the court ruled that the 
undisputed evidence presented by both plaintiff and defendant 
demonstrated that (1) plaintiff was defendant's employee; (2) as 
defendant's employee plaintiff's remedies were limited by Utah's 
worker's compensation statute; (3) "[t]he evidence is without 
dispute that there was some remuneration or compensation given to 
[plaintiff] as a consequence of his relationship with [defendant]"; 
and (4) plaintiff's right to exercise privileges afforded volunteer 
workers at defendant's place of business was sufficient to 
constitute compensation under Utah's Worker's Compensation Act. 
(See R. at 1077-78.) 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
1. In July, 1986 plaintiff filed his complaint in this 
action alleging in part that on or about June 21, 1985 plaintiff 
was injured while operating defendant's lawn mower under the 
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supervision of defendant's maintenance manager. Specifically, 
plaintiff plead that defendant was negligent in permitting 
plaintiff, a minor, to operate a lawn mower in violation of labor 
laws. (See R. at 1-4.) 
2. Defendant answered plaintiff's complaint and specifically 
alleged as a defense that "if it is established that plaintiff is 
an employee of this defendant, the benefits provided by the Utah 
Workman's Compensation Act are his exclusive remedy." (See R. 22.) 
Plaintiff newer responded to defendant's "employment defense" until 
it was argued as part of defendant's motion for a directed verdict. 
3. Prior to trial plaintiff moved to publish his deposition 
and that of his father. (R. 587.) As part of plaintiff's 
deposition he testified that he had been working at the theater 
before the day of the accident, mowing lawns, picking up cups, 
emptying garbage cans and vacuuming. Plaintiff had worked at 
defendant's establishment on many occasions and plaintiff even 
testified that he had mowed defendant's lawns quite a few times 
before the day of the accident. Plaintiff also worked at 
defendant's establishment in the winter and plaintiff reiterated 
that he often went to defendant's establishment to work with his 
father. {See R. at 635, 634, 622, & 616.) 
4. In his deposition published upon plaintiff's motion 
plaintiff's father testified that plaintiff had worked for 
defendant both the summer before and the summer during which the 
accident occurred. In fact, plaintiff's father expressly noted 
that as defendant's maintenance supervisor, if his sons had not 
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performed the work he would have had to hire someone else to 
complete it for defendant. (See R. at 638.) 
5. Prior to trial plaintiff submitted several motions in 
limine to the court. At least three of these motions were 
supported by memoranda affirmatively reiterating that plaintiff was 
a "volunteer worker" at defendant's establishment when he was 
injured and that plaintiff was working under the supervision of his 
father who was defendant's theater maintenance manager with the 
responsibility to hire volunteer and paid workers for the care and 
maintenance of defendant's grounds. (See R. at 738, 742, 754.) 
6. As part of a proposed pretrial order submitted by 
plaintiff to the court, plaintiff expressly reiterated his claim 
that he was a volunteer worker for defendant. (See R. at 931.) 
7. At the beginning of trial plaintiff, through his counsel, 
stated to the court that the evidence presented would demonstrate 
that plaintiff was a volunteer worker for defendant. (See R. 1091 
at 76.) 
8. At trial plaintiff's father testified that he was 
defendant's manager in charge of maintaining defendant's grounds 
and that his two sons, including the plaintiff herein, were working 
for defendant on the day plaintiff was injured. (See R. 1092 at 
301-02, 307, 319-23.) 
9. Plaintiff's father further testified that plaintiff was 
a regular worker at defendant's establishment since he came every 
day and worked for a couple of hours. (See R. 1092 at 317.) 
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10. Plaintiff's father stated that employment applications 
were not necessarily required for volunteer workers. (See R. 1092 
at 319-23.) 
11. And plaintiff's father stressed that at the time of 
plaintiff's injuries he was controlling plaintiff's activities not 
in his individual capacity as plaintiff's father but in his 
managerial capacity as defendant's manager. (See R. 1092 at 340-
44.) 
12. Defendant's president testified at trial that plaintiff's 
father was indeed defendant's manager in charge of maintenance and 
upkeep of the building and grounds. He also testified that 
plaintiff's father had authority to hire volunteers to work. (See 
R. 1092 at 365-67.) 
13. Defendant's president further stated that only paid 
employees were to operate lawn mowers or other hazardous equipment 
at defendant's establishment. He also noted that plaintiff's 
father was aware of this policy, and that all volunteer workers 
were to complete employment applications. (See R. 1092 at 368-
369.) There was no application for plaintiff on file in 
defendant's office and defendant's president never saw plaintiff 
operate a lciwn mower on defendant's premises. (See R. 1092 at 371-
72.) 
14. Defendant's president opined that plaintiff was not a 
staff member of defendant but was only working as an accommodation 
to plaintiff's father. (See R. 1092 at 373-74.) 
15. To prove he worked for defendant, plaintiff presented the 
testimony of 13-year-old Paul Carter, another volunteer employee 
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for defendant. Similar to plaintiff's situation, at the time of 
plaintiff's injury Mr. Carter had also assisted defendant in 
cleaning theaters and mowing lawns and had not filled out an 
application for voluntary employment since he too knew plaintiff's 
father. (See R. 1093 at 405-07.) 
16. As part of his testimony at trial plaintiff himself 
confirmed that he was able to swim in defendant's pool and view 
movies at defendant's establishment for free and that he had 
received payment from his father for mowing defendant's lawns. 
(See R. 1093 at 413, 479.) 
17. As part of defendant's case in chief defendant's 
president testified that the only reason he had not submitted 
plaintiff's application for worker's compensation benefits was due 
to the fact that plaintiff's father had asked him not to do so. 
(See R. 1093 at 481-83.) Nevertheless, defendant's president 
stated that defendant had worker's compensation insurance coverage 
at the time of the accident, that defendant considered its 
volunteers staff members and that volunteers received compensation 
for working at defendant's establishment in the form of free passes 
to defendant's theater for the volunteer, his family, and a 
personal friend, free passes to other movie theaters in Provo and 
Orem, Utah for themselves and their friends, swimming privileges at 
defendant's swimming pool, privileges at defendant's outdoor 
amphitheater, and discounts on all items purchased from defendant. 
(See R. 1092 at 373; R. 1093 at 481-82, 496-99.) And in fact, said 
compensation was a part of defendant's personnel handbook 
publication. (See R. 1093 at 496.) 
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18. Plaintiff's counsel conceded that plaintiff received 
benefits from working at defendant's facility, namely opportunities 
to utilize the facilities without charge, including attending 
movies and swimming. (See R. 1093 at 439-42.) Nevertheless, 
plaintiff claimed that he did not qualify as an employee of 
defendant since he did not get paid. (See R. 1093 at 443.) 
19. And as stated by the court, plaintiff's counsel alleged 
that plaintiff's father, "acting with[in] the course and scope of 
his employment, hired or employed, permitted, [plaintiff] to work; 
directed his activities, [and] told [plaintiff] when to work." 
(See R. 1093 at 444-45.) 
20. Counsel for defendant moved for a directed verdict on the 
ground that plaintiff's action was barred by the exclusive remedy 
provisions of Utah's worker's compensation statute, Utah Code Ann. 
§ 35-1-60. Specifically, defendant argued that under the evidence 
plaintiff was either defendant's employee and thus limited by the 
provisions of the Worker's Compensation Act or was not acting in 
any authorized capacity for defendant and was therefore a 
trespasser, imposing no duty upon defendant as a matter of law 
other than to refrain from intentionally and willfully injuring 
plaintiff. (See R. 1093 at 433-34.) 
21. In response, the court noted that being able to attend 
movies without charge and having available the other benefits 
indicated was certainly compensation within the meaning of Utah's 
Worker's Compensation Act and this Court's previous case analyses. 
(See R. 1093 at 443-44.) 
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22. Although plaintiff tried to defuse this fact by arguing 
that he was entitled to those benefits through his father's 
employment with defendant, the court noted that plaintiff earned 
those privileges in his own capacity and the fact that he may have 
had duplicate privileges through his father was not determinative 
as to whether or not plaintiff was defendant's employee. (See R. 
1093 at 507.) 
23. After hearing argument the court entered its directed 
verdict, findings of fact and conclusions of law in this case, 
ruling: 
The court finds that under the facts presented, 
[plaintiff] was an employee of [defendant], whether 
characterized as a volunteer or otherwise as an employee, 
and that as such, the remedies through which he is 
entitled to recover are limited by the Workmen's 
Compensation Statute. 
The question of whether or not an employee arrangement 
exists depends on several circumstances. The allegations 
and the proof demonstrate that [plaintiff's father] was 
himself an employee of [defendant] and that he was acting 
as the maintenance manager for the theater grounds on 
behalf of [defendant], he purported to exercise control 
over the time, place and circumstances of the work or 
services that were performed by [plaintiff]. 
[Plaintiff's father] purported to exercise the right to 
hire and fire employees and volunteers. Equipment was 
furnished by [defendant] and supervision over the use of 
the equipment was provided by [plaintiff's father]. 
The evidence is without dispute that there was some 
remuneration or compensation given to [plaintiff] as a 
consequence of his relationship with [defendant]. It 
appears to the Court that [plaintiff's] right in his own 
capacity to exercise privileges afforded to volunteer 
workers at [defendant] was sufficient to constitute 
compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act. 
(See R. 1077-78.) 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court correctly directed a verdict in defendant's 
favor inasmuch as all the evidence presented, including that 
offered and urged as credible by plaintiff himself, clearly and 
unequivocally demonstrated that plaintiff was defendant's employee 
at the time of the injury and was thus limited to the remedies of 
Utah's Worker's Compensation Act. 
In the alternative, if the trial court erred in directing a 
verdict, the error was harmless and there is no reasonable 
likelihood of a more favorable result for plaintiff absent such 
error since if plaintiff was not defendant's employee, plaintiff 
was a trespasser to defendant and, as such, was not entitled under 
the law to protection from defendant above defendant's duty to 
refrain from willfully or intentionally injuring plaintiff, which 
duty was not breached here. 
In other respects, plaintiff's novel argument on appeal that 
this Court should acknowledge the employment category of 
"gratuitous servant" cannot be considered since it was not raised 
to the trial court below; and such "gratuitous servant" employment 
status is not otherwise recognized under Utah law. 
Finally, since plaintiff himself insisted that his worker's 
compensation application not be filed with the Industrial 
Commission plaintiff cannot now be heard to complain that this 
Court should grant him relief or that he should not be bound by 
provisions of Utah's Worker's Compensation Act when he himself 
failed to seek the assistance of the Industrial Commission in 
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evaluating whether he was defendant's employee at the time of his 
injury. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT ERROR IN DIRECTING A 
VERDICT IN PLAINTIFF'S FAVOR GIVEN THE CLEAR AND 
UNEQUIVOCAL EVIDENCE OFFERED AT TRIAL, INCLUDING THAT 
URGED AS CREDIBLE BY PLAINTIFF HIMSELF, AS APPLIED TO 
UTAH LAW, 
The trial court's decision to direct a verdict in defendant's 
favor was appropriate and without error given the application of 
Utah law to the evidence plaintiff himself presented to the court 
and urged as dispositive. 
A. 
PLAINTIFF WAS DEFENDANT'S EMPLOYEE GIVEN THE EVIDENCE 
PLAINTIFF HIMSELF PRESENTED AT TRIAL APPLIED TO THE 
FACTORS CONSIDERED DISPOSITIVE BY THIS COURT. 
Since the inception of this case and throughout trial below 
plaintiff himself sought to convince the court that defendant was 
responsible for permanent injuries he suffered as a result of an 
accident that occurred while plaintiff was working for defendant 
and mowing defendant's lawn. As noted above, beginning with his 
complaint plaintiff stressed the fact that he was working for 
defendant at the time of the injury. And plaintiff's allegations 
of employment became more pronounced before trial, although 
defendant had raised in its answer the affirmative defense that the 
provisions of Utah Worker's Compensation Act constituted 
plaintiff's exclusive remedy. (See R. at 22.) 
Prior to trial plaintiff submitted numerous motions in limine, 
several of which were supported by memoranda urging as follows: 
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[Plaintiff], a 7 year old minor child was a 
volunteer worker at [defendant] when he was injured in 
June 21, 1985. [Plaintiffs] father, Paul Gourdin, was 
the theater maintenance manager and had been employed by 
[defendant] for many years. fPlaintiff s father! had 
responsibility for hiring volunteer and paid works Tsicl 
and for the care and maintenance of the grounds. and was 
supervising fplaintiff] the day of the accident. 
Utah Code Annotated § 34-23-1 et seq. prohibits the 
employment of children under the age of 14 in an 
occupational setting in the use of power lawn equipment 
• . . • 
(See R. 741-42 (emphasis added); accord R. 753-54; R. 737-38.) And 
in a pretrial order submitted by plaintiff, he urged that he was a 
volunteer worker for defendant when he was injured. (See R. at 
931.) 
Plaintiff's argument and theory that he was working for 
defendant at the time of his injury was further stressed at trial. 
Beginning with his counsel's opening statement plaintiff stressed: 
On the 21st day of June, 1985 [plaintiff's father], who 
was in charge of the theater, in charge of taking care of 
the grounds, mowing the grounds, had, as he had had 
before, his sons with him. And the evidence will be that 
his sons were volunteer workers, and that they had been 
there before doing what they were that day, and on that 
day they were mowing the lawn. 
. . . and [plaintiff] was at [defendant] and as I have 
told you he had been there many times before and he was 
mowing the lawn. 
(See R. 1091 at 76-77 (emphasis added).) 
Plaintiff's father, an acknowledged employee of defendant, 
then testified that plaintiff was working for defendant at the time 
of the accident: 
Q [By plaintiff's counsel] Mr* Gourdin, I direct your 
attention to June 21, 1985, and ask, were you employed by 
[defendant] at that time? 
A Yes, I was. 
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Q Would you tell the jury what your duties and 
responsibilities at [defendant] were in June of 1985? 
A I was responsible for care and maintenance of the 
building, cleaning the inside, outside, flowers, shrubs, 
mowing the lawns; general upkeep of the building and 
grounds. 
Q For how long had you been charged with those duties and 
responsibilities prior to June 21, 1985? 
A Three or four years. 
Q Now, in June of 1985 did [defendant] have volunteer 
forces? 
A Yes. 
Q Now, were you authorized, in your capacity — well, 
you've given us your duties and responsibilities. Tell 
us your title? 
A Manager in charge of maintenance and grounds. 
Q Now, in 1985 did [defendant] have volunteer workers 
working for them? 
A Yes, they did. 
Q Would you tell the jury, please, what a volunteer worker 
is, as you understand it? 
A It's a person who would come into [defendant's] theater 
and work one day or more a week for two or three, up to 
four hours, and were not paid for their services. 
Q Why? 
A Because it was, [defendant] is a community theater, and 
many people that work there do so on a volunteer basis. 
And the young people would give their time as service to 
the community. 
Q Were there volunteer workers there on June 21, 1985 
working on the grounds or cutting the lawn around 
[defendant]? 
A Yes. 
Q And who were they? 
A [Plaintiff and his brother] were there working. 
Q Now, who was operating power lawn mowers on that day? 
A Both [plaintiff and his brother]. 
. . . . 
Q All right. Mr. Gourdin, for whom was [plaintiff] working 
on June 21, 1985? 
A For [defendant]. 
. . . . 
Q [By defendant's counsel] And would it be fair to say that 
[plaintiff] was certainly not a regular person at mowing 
the lawn at [defendant]? 
A Not perhaps every week but, yes, he did mow it. 
Q Was he a regular there, Mr. Gourdin? 
A He usually came every day and worked for a couple of 
hours, yes. 
• • . . 
Q Well, let me ask you this. In 1985, besides [plaintiff] 
and [his brother], did you have any other volunteers that 
worked there for you? 
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A Yes. As, I was trying to put the dates in from the time. 
We had kids that would come in and clean after the summer 
matinees. They were volunteer workers. 
. . . . 
Q And what was the youngest volunteer working that you ever 
had working there at [defendant]? 
A Other than [plaintiff]? 
Q Let's count [plaintiff]. 
A [Plaintiff] would have been the youngest. 
• • • . 
Q [By plaintiff's counsel] All right. A couple of points. 
In 1985, in June, who had the authority to hire and use 
volunteer workers at [defendant]? 
A I did. 
Q You did have that authority? 
A Yes. 
Q And you testified that you were controlling [plaintiff], 
telling him what to do. And my question to you, Sir, is: 
In what capacity were you operating in when you were 
controlling rplaintiff'si activities, (a) your individual 
capacity, or (b) your capacity as a manager of 
fdefendant]? 
. . . . 
A Basically as the manager of rdefendant!. 
. . . . 
Q Whose grass was cut that day, on the 21st day of June, 
1985 [when plaintiff was injured]? 
A [Defendant's]. 
Q And for whose benefit was that, on 21 June, 1985 [when 
plaintiff was injured]? 
A [Defendant's]. 
(R. 1092 at 301-02, 307, 317, 321, 323, 340-41, & 344 (emphasis 
added).) And in his deposition published at plaintiff's request 
plaintiff's father also testified: 
Q So [plaintiff] had worked as a volunteer employee the 
summer before? This was his second summer? 
A Yes. When he really worked, I mean, they go with me 
every place I go, but that is when they actually really 
start to have them do work. 
Q What I am wondering, though, Paul, is this a situation 
where these kids are really volunteer workers, or is it 
just like my 7-year-old son comes to work with me and 
hangs around me for a couple of hours? 
A No, because if I did not have them do the work, I would 
have to have somebody else come in and do the work. We 
had to have so many boys come in each day and help us, 
because that is how we kept down the pay help, was by 
having the volunteer help come in. So if I did not have 
them come, I had to have somebody else come in. 
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Q Tell me what [plaintiff] had done? What was 
[plaintiff's] job. 
A The boys would pick papers up around the building. They 
would carry candy inside, fix candy on the tables. They 
helped mow the lawns. 
at 637-38 (emphasis added).) 
Thereafter, plaintiff himself testified: 
Q [By defendant's counsel] [Plaintiff] how old were you 
when you first went to [defendant]? 
A When I was a baby. 
Q Did you always go there with your father? 
A Usually. 
Q Did you like to go to [defendant]? 
A Yes. 
Q Did you think it was fun to go to [defendant]? 
A Yes. 
Q What kind of things did you do when you were at 
[defendant]? 
A Well, like pick up cups down the aisles, make paper 
airplanes. 
Q Did you make paper airplanes the morning of the accident? 
A Can't remember. 
Q Did you swim in the pool at [defendant]? 
A Yes. 
Q Were you able to get in for free? 
A Yes. 
Q Did you go to movies there at [defendant]? 
A Yes. 
Q I guess you got into these free to one? [sic] 
A Yes. 
1093 at 412-13.) And plaintiff later reemphasized his status 
defendant's employee: 
Q [By defendant's counsel] [Plaintiff], what I would like 
you to do, if you would be kind enough, is to read 
portions of your deposition, starting on page 12, just a 
few lines. I will read the question; if you would be 
kind enough to read the answer. 
Q "Did you ever get any money for mowing the lawns?" 
A "Not from [defendant]. Sometimes from my dad, just when 
he would just give me something." 
Q "Your dad would give you some money?" 
A "The witness is nodding his head in the affirmative." 
1093 at 479.) Plaintiff's own testimony that he was working 
defendant at the time of the accident and was compensated 
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therefore was also reiterated through plaintiff's published 
deposition statements: 
Q [By defense counsel] When you went to [defendant], were 
you always with your father? 
A Yes. 
Q When you went there to work? 
A Yes 
Q Did you ever go there to work without your father? 
A When I was over at my Grandma's, I would. 
(R. 616 (emphasis added).) 
Thereafter, plaintiff presented the testimony of 13-year-old 
Paul Carter who testified that, similar to plaintiff's situation, 
(1) he worked as a volunteer for defendant cleaning the theaters 
and mowing the lawns, (2) he had never filled out an application 
and (3) he had received movie tickets as compensation. (See R. 
1093 at 405-07.) 
And finally, the court heard testimony from defendant's 
president that defendant had worker's compensation insurance 
coverage at the time of the accident, that defendant considered its 
volunteers staff members and that volunteers received compensation 
for working at defendant's establishment in the form of free passes 
to defendant's theater for the volunteer, his family, and a 
personal friend, free passes to other movie theaters in Provo and 
Orem, Utah for themselves and their friends, swimming privileges at 
defendant's swimming pool, privileges at defendant's outdoor 
amphitheater, and discounts on all items purchased from defendant. 
(See R. 1092 at 373; R. 1093 at 481-82, 496-99.) And in fact, said 
compensation was a part of defendant's personnel handbook 
publication. (See R. 1093 at 496.) 
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After hearing all this evidence unequivocally demonstrating 
that plaintiff was employed by defendant at the time his injuries 
were sustained, the court ruled: 
[Under] the facts presented, [plaintiff] was an 
employee of [defendant] whether characterized as a 
volunteer or otherwise as an employee, and that as such, 
the remedies through which he is entitled to recover are 
limited by the Workman's Compensation Statute. 
The question of whether or not an employee 
arrangement exists depends on several circumstances. The 
allegations and the proof demonstrate that [plaintiff's 
father] himself was an employee of [defendant] and that 
he was acting as a maintenance manager for the theater 
grounds. On behalf of [defendant], he purported to 
exercise control over the time, place and circumstances 
of the worker's services that were performed by 
[plaintiff]. [Plaintiff's father] purported to exercise 
the right to hire and fire employees and volunteers. 
Equipment was furnished by [defendant] and supervision 
over the use of the equipment was provided by 
[plaintiff's father]. 
The evidence is without dispute that there was some 
remuneration or compensation given to [plaintiff] as a 
consequence of his relationship with [defendant]. It 
appears to the court that [plaintiff's] right in his own 
capacity to exercise privileges afforded to volunteer 
workers at [defendant] was sufficient to constitute 
compensation under the Workman's Compensation Act. 
(R. at 1077-78.) The court concluded as such notwithstanding 
plaintiff's argument that plaintiff could not be defendant's 
employee bee a • • ;ec:i to accept,, 
compensation available to him since he already obtained benefits 
through his father's employment with defendant. (See R. 1093 at 
44-505; R 3 093 at 433-455 ) In directing its verdict, the court 
correctly distinguished the very cases plaintiff now cites on 
appeal, ruling that plaintiff received coiripensai I on in l\h*j fnrni af 
free tickets and other items, was supervised by defendant's manager 
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and was not working for his own individual purposes. (See R. 1093 
at 443-45, 455.) In short, the court concluded: 
That [plaintiff's father] himself was a manager of 
the grounds that on behalf of, purported to exercise 
control over the time, place and circumstances of the 
work or services that were performed by [plaintiff]; that 
[plaintiff's father] purported to exercise the right to 
hire and fire employees or volunteers; that equipment was 
furnished by [defendant] and was supervised in the use 
thereof determined by [plaintiff's father]. 
And the evidence is without dispute that there was 
some remuneration or compensation given to [plaintiff] as 
a consequence of his relationship with defendant. 
Whether or not he exercised that right, it appears that 
he did not, that he had the same advantages he would 
otherwise have had by reason of his father's employment. 
. . . . 
Ordinarily, the question of these matters may be a 
question of fact, a mixed question of fact and law. But 
where they are unrefuted and undisputed as to these 
items, it appears to the court that it does become a 
matter and a question of law for the court to decide. 
« . . . 
I'm concerned about this case, I fretted about it, 
worried about it, and realize that the consequences of 
the court taking it away from the jury is a serious 
thing. But I do believe that under the circumstances and 
the proof that is before this court, that the court has 
no alternative. 
(R. 1093 at 504-508.) The trial Judge's ruling was correct as a 
matter of law. 
In evaluating whether plaintiff was an employee of defendant 
at the time of the accident, this Court should first look to the 
pertinent provisions of Utah worker's compensations statutory 
scheme. Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-42 (Supp. 1985) defined employers 
thusly: 
(2) Every person, firm and private corporation, 
including every public utility, having in service one or 
more workmen or operatives regularly employed in the same 
business, or in or about the same establishment, under 
any contract of hire, express or implied, oral or written 
18 
The term "regularly" as herein used shall include 
all employments in the usual course of the trade, 
business, profession, or occupation of the employerf 
whether continuous throughout the year or for only a 
portion of the year. 
SI mi larly Utah Code Ann. § 3 5-1-41 (Siipp. 1985) defined an 
employee as: 
(b) every person in the service of any 
employer, as defined in Subsection 35-1-42(2), who 
employs one or more workers or operatives regularly in 
the same business, or in or about the same establishment, 
under any contract or hire, express or implied, oral or 
written, including aliens, and minors whether legally or 
illegally working for hire, but not including any person 
whose employment is casual and not in the usual course of 
trade, business, or occupation of his employer. 
These statutes form the basis in this action for determining 
whether the -; :•" • « -irieciy provi sloes of Utah's Worker's 
Compensation Act apply ko plaintiff pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§ 35-1-60. Based upon the above statutes an employer is one who 
regularly employs workers under an express or implied and oral, or 
written contract. And an employee is likewise any person in the 
service of one who
 regUiariy employs others under express or 
implied and oral or written contracts. 
This Court has repeatedly considered the issue of when an 
individual i s an employee under Utah Worker s Compensation Act in 
its various amended forms. Most recently, in Board of Education of 
Alpine School District v. Olsen, 684 P.2d 49 (Utah 1984), this 
Court heard an appeal from an administi ative ] aw judge's award of 
worker's compensation benefits to an individual the administrative 
law judge had found "volunteer" of the school district. In 
that case, before analyzing the plaintiff's relationship with the 
employer this Court initially noted that as a volunteer the 
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plaintiff was not eligible for worker's compensation under Utah 
law.1 See id. at 51. Thereafter the Court articulated several 
factors controlling whether an employment relationship existed: 
An employee is hired and paid a salary or wage, 
works under the direction of the employer, and is subject 
to the employer's control. 
We have also considered the intent of the parties, 
and the business of the employer. 
In the present case, [plaintiff] received no 
compensation for helping in shop classes. He was brought 
in as a RSVP volunteer. The lunch tickets were not 
provided by the [defendant] school district, but by RSVP. 
The [defendant] school district had no control over his 
hours or any other aspect of his volunteer work. There 
is no evidence that he or the school district intended to 
establish an employment relationship, even an informal 
one. [Plaintiff] operated his own residential 
construction business, and from the record it appears 
that most of the carpentry work he performed as a 
"volunteer" was in fact for his business. At the time of 
the injury, he was working on a personal project. 
Id. at 52 (citation omitted). 
In addition to concluding that the employee/employer 
relationship turns upon an analysis of (1) whether the individual 
is hired and paid a salary or wage; (2) whether the individual 
works under the direction of the employer; (3) whether the 
importantly, for purposes of this Court's review of the 
instant case, the fact that plaintiff's status was termed a 
"volunteer worker" and the fact that defendant has acknowledged 
that volunteers work for defendant is neither particularly 
relevant nor outcome determinative. The term "volunteer" in this 
case only served to distinguish defendant's employees that 
received monetary wages from those that received other forms of 
compensation. And, as noted above, even defendant's president 
acknowledged that volunteer workers were considered staff 
employees of defendant. Thus, as in Olsen, the real issue in 
this case is not whether the plaintiff had the title "volunteer 
worker," but whether, as the trial court concluded, plaintiff was 
defendant's employee. 
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individual is subject to the employers control; (4) the intent of 
the parties; and (5) the business of the employer, this Court has 
also enumerated several other factors to be considered in 
establishing whether such an employment relationship exists. These 
factors include analyzing (6) whether viewing the individual as an 
employee would be contrary to the purpose of the worker's 
compensation statute, see id. at 52; (7) the covenants or 
agreements existing concerning the right of direction and control 
over the employee whether express or implied, Glen M. Barney & Sons 
v, Industrial Commission, 609 P.2d 948, 949 (Utah 1980); (8) the 
employer's right to hire or fire the individual, see id.; (9) the 
method of pay ment i nvol ved, see id. ; (1 0) who furn i shes the 
equipment, see id.: (11) whether the claimed employee is regularly 
"working" as required by the Worker's Compensation Act or is merely 
a casual employee, Palle v. Industrial Commission, 7 P. 2d 2 84, 2 90 
(Utah 1932); Sommerville v. Industrial Commission, 196 P.2d 718, 
720-21 (Utah 1948); and (12) whether the employee is in the service 
of an employer. See Bennett v. Industrial Commission, 72 6 P. 2d 
427, 429 (Utah 1986). 
While the elements of control by the employer and 
the intent of the parties are the most important 
fcriteria1, none of the fabove-listed1 factors separately 
is controlling. It is from consideration of all of them 
together that determination is to be made whether the 
relationship is in essence of that of an 
employer/employee or independent contractor. 
Rustler Lodge v. Industrial Commission, 562 P.2d 227, 228-29 (Utah 
1977) (emphasis added) (citing Sutton v. Industrial Commission, 9 
Utah 2d 339, 344 P.2d 538, 540 (1959)). And certainly this Court's 
analysis must take into account the purposes of Utah's Worker's 
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Compensation Act which must be liberally construed and should be 
viewed as "broad enough to cover all employment relationships," 
Ortega v. Salt Lake Wet Wash Laundry, 156 P.2d 885, 888 (Utah 
1945), since "the provisions are intended to expand liability to 
those who may not qualify as a common law employee." Pinter 
Construction Company v. Frisbv, 678 P.2d 305, 308 (Utah 1984). 
Consideration of each of the factors enumerated by this Court 
establishes the appropriateness of the court7s directed verdict 
below. 
1^ 
PLAINTIFF RECEIVED COMPENSATION 
FOR WORKING FOR DEFENDANT. 
As noted above, this Court has previously ruled that one of 
the factors to consider in determining whether an employee/employer 
relationship exists is whether "[a]n employee is hired and paid a 
salary or wage." Olsen, 684 P.2d at 52. While the worker's 
compensation statutes do not provide a definition for wage, this 
Court in another context has previously cited with approval the 
definition of "wages" used in the "Model Compensation and 
Rehabilitation Law (Revised)," published by the Council of State 
Governments: 
"Wages" means in addition to money payments for 
services rendered, the reasonable value of board, rent, 
housing, lodging, fuel or similar advantage received from 
the employer, and gratuities received in the course of 
employment from others than the employer." 
Blake Stevens Construction v. Henion, 697 P.2d 230, 231 (Utah 1985) 
(emphasis added). This Court also has recognized that "most courts 
that have considered the question have included as part of an 
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employee's wages, living quarters and food which are provided to an 
employee," including such things as meals, taxi farer and 
utilities. Id. at 231-32. This acknowledgment comports with this 
Coin: t s implici t ho] di ng :i i 1 Olsen, supra wherein it ruled that the 
plaintiff therein was not an employee of the Board of Education 
considering the fact, among others, that the Board itself had not 
provided the plaintiff lunch as compensation for his work, at, I, he 
school. See Olsen, 684 P.2d at 52. In holding as such, this Court 
emphasized that had the plaintiff in Olsen been awarded lunch or 
other compensation for his work or services, at least one factor in 
the employment relationship analysis would have been met. 
The fact that compensation awarded an entpl oyee can be other 
than money was recognized in cases previously cited by this Court. 
See, e.g.. Henion, 697 P.2d at 231-32. Yet plaintiff would have 
this Court believe that he received no compensation for working for 
defendant other than an occasional theater pass. However, under 
this Court's previous ruling :i n Olsen and genera] principles of 
worker's compensation law the requirements of "salary" or "wage" 
are met in even a pure definitional sense by the receipt of such 
"compensation, " "recompense" m "ret,urn, " Fin ther ,. the trial court 
had before it unrefuted evidence that plaintiff was afforded not 
only theater passes for himself, his family and friends, but 
likewise was able to receive free admission to swimming facilities 
and discounts on items purchased from defendant As the trial 
court noted, free theater passes resulted in significant savings tc> 
plaintiff and thus equated to compensation under the worker's 
compensation scheme. (See R. 1093 at 443.) And, even though it 
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may be argued that plaintiff was otherwise entitled to similar 
benefits through his father's employment with defendant, whether or 
not an employee takes advantage or uses said compensation is not 
relevant for determining that employee's status. The critical 
question is whether compensation is afforded the employee as it was 
to plaintiff in this case. 
Moreover, in urging this Court to conclude that he did not 
receive compensation plaintiff selectively ignores that he admitted 
to having received money from his father after working at 
defendant's establishment. The evidence presented to the trial 
court as to the receipt of these monies certainly demonstrates that 
in addition to the other recompense or return noted above, 
plaintiff received substance for his work as defendant's employee. 
As this Court has recognized, under the Model Compensation Act, 
such "gratuities received in the course of employment from others 
than the employer" certainly constitute wages; Henion, 697 P.2d at 
231, and any argument to the contrary is without support in the 
record and violates common sense. 
In sum, unlike the plaintiff in Olsen, supra, plaintiff in 
this case was afforded the equivalent of his "lunch ticket," namely 
his theate»r, swimming and discount tickets, directly from 
defendant. See Olsen, 684 P.2d at 52. 
2± 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DETERMINED THAT 
PLAINTIFF WORKED UNDER DEFENDANT'S DIRECTION 
As noted in this Court's decision in Olsen, another factor in 
determining whether an employment relationship exists is whether an 
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employee "works under the direction of the employer." See Olsen, 
684 P.2d at 52. This principle was stated by this Court at least 
as early as 192 0, See Strieker v. Industrial Commission, 55 Utah 
603, 188 , B4'":)'„ H'VI (1920), In Olsen there was no indi cati on that 
that plaintiff worked under the direction of his claimed employer, 
the school district. In contrast, in this case the record is 
replete with uncontroverted evidence that plaintiff worked under 
the direct supervision of his father, who held the responsibility 
as a manager c >f defendant's grounds tc > h i re and supervise 
maintenance workers, Further, plaintiff testified that he would 
take instructions from his father as to work that needed to be 
performed and h :i s father would supervise his efforts. (See R. i Jti,-
742, 754, 1092 at 340-44.) There can be no dispute that this prong 
of the employment analysis has been met.2 
2s. 
ALL THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED BELOW CLEARLY 
DEMONSTRATED THAT PLAINTIFF WAS SUBJECT TO 
DEFENDANTS CONTROL. 
This Court has also listed the "subject to the employer's 
control" factor as pertinent in establishing whether an employment 
relationship exists. See Olsen, CiB4 P , ?d at S2 , As this Com t has 
repeatedly noted, "it is not the actual exercise of control that 
determines whether an employer/employee relationship exists" or the 
"degree of control" which is essential but the "right to control 
2While plaintiff also incorrectly argued below that his 
status as a minor precluded the court from ruling that he was an 
employee, this argument is entirely without merit under the 
applicable statute and this Court's previous rulings. See 
Bingham v. Lagoon Corporation, 707 P.2d 678, 679 (Utah 1985) 
overruling in part Ortega, 156 P.2d 885, 
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that is determinative." Frisby, 678 P.2d at 309 (citations 
omitted); Bambrouah v. Bethers, 552 P.2d 1286, 1291 (Utah 1976) 
(footnote omitted); Sommerville, 196 P.2d at 720. In Bennett v. 
Industrial Commission of Utah, 726 P.2d 427, 430 (Utah 1986), this 
Court held: 
many factors have been applied in determining the right 
to control. Among those factors are actual supervision 
of the worker, the extent of the supervision, the method 
of payment, the furnishing of equipment for the worker, 
and the right to terminate the worker. These factors are 
to be applied in favor of the employee relationship. 
In 01sen, this Court ruled that "the school district had no 
control over [plaintiff's] hours or any other aspect of his 
volunteer work." See 684 P.2d at 52. In Sommerville, this Court 
likewise found no evidence that the employer had any right to 
control the work of the plaintiff since the claimed employer had 
"merely showed" the plaintiff what work was to be performed. See 
196 P.2d at 720. In contrast, in Frisby, the employer had the 
right to control the employee since he maintained some control over 
the materials used on the job and was a "job superintendent." See 
678 P.2d at 309. And in Bambrough, the right to control was 
evidenced by the fact that the employer directed the employee's 
efforts. See 552 P.2d at 1289-92. 
In contrast to this Court's opinion in Olsen and in similarity 
to the decisions in Frisby and Bambrough, the plaintiff herein was 
subject to defendant's control in all respects. Here plaintiff's 
father, defendant's maintenance manager, supervised plaintiff by 
plaintiff's own admissions, provided the materials used and 
directed all of plaintiff's efforts. Frisby, 678 P.2d at 309; 
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Bennett, 726 P.2d at 430. As a maintenance worker for defendant, 
plaintiff was subject to defendant's control, which right of 
control defendant in fact repeatedly exercised in instructing 
plaintiff, through defendant's supervisor, as to duties that needed 
to be performed and the manner of accomplishing the same. (See R. 
at 635, 634, 622, R. 1092 at 317.1 Plaintiff herein was not 
performing work for his own business, was the case in Olsen, C>84 
P.2d at 52, and there is clearly no allegation that plaintiff was 
working at hi s c wi I personal project. 
In short, as with the other employment factors noted above, 
there is no evidence to support any conclusion other than that 
plaintiff wa.1-. subject to detendant':*' ••• >nt ro I s'n h i ,s wui 1. , 
establishing the employment relationship in that respect. 
4 , 
THE INTENT OF THE PARTIES CLEARLY 
DEMONSTRATES THAT AN EMPLOYMENT 
RELATIONSHIP EXISTED. 
The intent of the parties is a further element to be 
considered in determining whether an employee/employer relationship 
exists. See Olsen, 684 P.2d at 52. In analyzing this factor, 
plaintiff's consent to ac t as an employee is certain] y relevant 
In Bambrouah, this Court previously held: 
the Utah Workmen's Compensation Act does not expressly 
require consent on the employee's part to establish the 
requisite relationship, nor is a written contract a 
required formality for workmen's compensation for 
purposes under the laws of Utah. , Under Utah law 
consent to the relationship may be implied by the conduct 
of the parties. 
See 552 P.2d at 1291-92 (footnote omitted; emphasis added). Given 
the facts presented below, the trial court had no choice but to 
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conclude that the parties intended that an employer/employee 
relationship exist since both parties consented to the same through 
their conduct. In contrast to the plaintiff in Olsen, supra, 
plaintiff herein was solely working and benefitting defendant in 
mowing defendant's lawns and doing other necessary work. Further, 
plaintiff was paid for such services and was entitled to receive 
additional compensation therefor. These facts, together with the 
express and intentional supervisory conduct on the part of 
defendant's manager, plaintiff's father, demonstrates that both 
parties intended that an employment relationship exist. 
THE FACT THAT THE SERVICES PLAINTIFF RENDERED 
WERE NECESSARY FOR DEFENDANT'S BUSINESS 
ESTABLISHES THE EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP. 
As this Court has likewise noted, an additional factor to 
consider in addressing the instant issue is whether the employee 
rendered services "necessary to or in furtherance of his employer's 
usual trade, business, or occupation." See Sorenson v. Industrial 
Commission, 598 P.2d 362, 363 (Utah 1979) (citing Sommerville, 113 
Utah 504, 509, 596 P.2d 718, 721). As conceded in plaintiff's 
brief plaintiff was injured while performing work which was 
regularly performed by defendant's employees. Unlike the facts in 
Olsen, where that plaintiff was basically working for himself on 
school district premises, here plaintiff was working for defendant 
to maintain grounds which were the very subject of defendant's 
trade and business. 
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1L-L 
THE IMPLICIT AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE PARTIES 
ESTABLISHES THE EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP. 
As noted in Glen M. Barney & Sons, another factor which bear s 
on the employment relationship is "whatever covenants or agreements 
exist < oncerninq the riqht. ol direction and control over the 
employee, whether express or implied." 609 P.2d at 949. As stated 
previously, Utah's Worker's Compensation Act does not require 
consent on the employee's part to establish the relationship, just 
as it does not require a written contract. Bambrouah, 552 P.2d at 
1291, Instead, "it is sufficient 'if at the time of the accident, 
[the employee] was engaged in [defendant's] same employment.' 
Under Utah law consent to the relationship may be implied by the 
conduct of the pan ties. " Id. at J 291 -92 (citi ng Peterson v. 
Fowler, 27 Utah 2d 159, 493 P.2d 997 (1972)). 
Here, plaintiff was certainly engaged in defendant's 
employment at the time of hi s accident and h I s conduct i n 
subjecting himself on repeated occasions to the supervision of 
defendant's maintenance manager indicates as much. Even plaintiff 
admits in his brief on appeal that he was under the direction and 
supervision of defendant's maintenance manager (see plaintiff's 
brief at 14) and that p] a i nti ff was "consi dered an employee." (See 
plaintiff's brief at 18.) A clear and complete reading of the 
record belies plaintiff's claim that there was no implied contract 
and utterly refutes plaintiff's erroneous allegations or inferences 
that (1) defendant chose not to submit an injury report to the 
Industrial Commission (see plaintiff's brief at 6 ) ; (2) pi a intiff 
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did not receive valuable compensation for his work (see plaintiff's 
brief at 8); (3) plaintiff never received monetary compensation for 
his work (see plaintiff's brief at 18); and (4) the lack of a 
contract of hire is enough to bar a conclusion that plaintiff was 
an employee. (See plaintiff's brief at 20.) As plaintiff 
expressly admits in his brief, plaintiff "was acting under the 
direction and control of [defendant] when he was injured, and so 
was not a trespasser, licensee or invitee." (See plaintiff's brief 
at 8 (emphasis added).) Incongruously, plaintiff on one hand 
wishes this Court to accept that plaintiff was under the direction 
and control of defendant when he was injured so that this Court 
will not otherwise view plaintiff as a trespasser, yet on the other 
hand attempts to deny that an employment relationship existed. 
7^ 
DEFENDANT HAD THE RIGHT TO HIRE AND FIRE PLAINTIFF. 
There is no question that defendant had the right to hire or 
fire plaintiff and plaintiff has not disputed such fact. 
!LL 
DEFENDANT'S METHOD OF PAYMENT TO PLAINTIFF WAS SUFFICIENT 
TO ESTABLISH THE EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP. 
As this Court stated in Glen M. Barney & Sons, "the method of 
payment, i.e. whether in wages or fees, as compared to payment for 
a complete job or project" is a factor to consider in determining 
whether an employee/employer relationship exists. See 609 P.2d at 
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949. Here, notwithstanding plaintiff's arguments to the contrary, 
plaintiff received valuable compensation for his work.3 
9^ 
DEFENDANT FURNISHED PLAINTIFF'S EQUIPMENT. 
Whether the employer furnished the employee's equipment is a 
further factor to consider in determining the existence of an 
employment relationship. See Glen M. Barney & Sons. bOy P 2d at 
949. As this Court has acknowledged, "the furnishing of valuable 
equipment to a worker Indicates an employer/employee relationship." 
(See Bennett, 726 P.2d at 430.) Certainly in this instance 
defendant furnished plaintiff valuable lawn equipment to perform 
the services r endered. Such fdcl;i alsu support the determination 
that plaintiff was defendant's employee. 
10. 
PLAINTIFF WAS MORE THAN A CASUAL 'WORKER 
IN DEFENDANT'S REGULAR WORK. 
As noted above, another factor pertinent z employment 
relationship is whether the employer regularly employed others for 
at least a por ti on of 1:1 le year in the same services as those the 
employee performed, and whether the employee's work was casual as 
that term is defined in context with the act. See Utah Code Ann. 
3The fact that benefits were available to plaintiff through 
his father's employment with defendant is also irrelevant since 
plaintiff could receive his own benefits such benefits were 
apparently different from those that plaintiff's father received. 
By his own account plaintiff would also be allowed to receive 
free movie tickets for his friends, which "companion" tickets for 
both plaintiff and plaintiff's friends were evidently not 
otherwise available through his father's employment. (See 
plaintiff's brief at 14 (plaintiff's father evidently entitled to 
tickets for family or friends).) 
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§§ 35-1-42f -43. Contrary to plaintiff's argument in his brief, in 
order to be defendant's employee plaintiff need not have been 
regularly employed by defendant, but insteadf need only have been 
more than casually employed by defendant who regularly employed for 
the same work plaintiff performed. 
Applying this test, there is no dispute that defendant 
regularly esmployed plaintiff and others for lawn and facilities 
maintenance. Further, as this Court has previously stated, the 
test "as to whether an employee is a casual employee is whether the 
services rendered by him are necessary to, or in furtherance of his 
employer's usual trade, business, or occupation." Sommerville, 196 
P.2d at 721. And this Court has ruled that casual or occasional 
employment in the usual course of the employer's trade or business 
does not preclude the employee relationship since the terms 
"regularly employed" and "casual" as utilized in Utah's worker's 
compensation statute "was intended to include all employments, 
regular, casual, or occasional, in the usual trade or business of 
the employer." In other words, the term "regularly employed" as it 
is used in the applicable statute 
is to be determined by the character of the work in which 
[the individual is] employed, however brief or long, and 
not by the character of the employment, whether regular, 
casual, occasional, periodical, or otherwise, so long as 
fthe individual was] hired and engaged to do work in the 
common or usual business of the employer. 
See Palle, 7 P.2d at 290 (emphasis added). Given this Court's 
rulings there is no question that plaintiff meets the status of 
defendant's employee based upon his more than casual work for 
defendant who regularly employed individuals to perform the exact 
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services plaintiff rendered. And, even under plaintiff's erroneous 
view of "regular employment" argued in his brief the testimony of 
defendant's manager, plaintiff's father, fully supports the 
conclusion thai plaintiff worked for defendant on a daily basis and 
not just sporadically as plaintiff would have this Court now 
believe. 
11, 
THE CONCLUSION THAT PLAINTIFF WAS DEFENDANT'S EMPLOYEE 
IS NOT CONTRARY TO THE 
PURPOSE OF UTAH'S WORKER'S COMPENSATION STATUTE. 
As a final factor in determining whether plaintiff was an 
employee of defendant, this Court should look ^ purpose of 
Utah,""" s worker s compensation scheme• See Asen, P. 2d 52 • 
Having repeatedly considered the Worker's Compensation Act over the 
years this Court is intensely aware of the Act's underpinnings and 
the principles involved that favor defining injured workers as 
employees covered by the terms of Utah's worker's compensation 
scheme, Although not comprehensively stated, these pri nci p] es were 
recognized in Bennett v. Industrial Commission of Utah, when this 
Court reiterated Professor Larsen's views that the remedial purpose 
of the Worker's Compensate on Act: 
is to spread the burden of industrial accidents across 
the population. Therefore, Larsen suggests, more 
emphasis should be placed on the nature of the work 
performed. If a worker is integrally or continuously 
involved in an employer's business, and the worker's own 
operations are not such that they could readily channel 
the cost of an industrial accident to the general 
population, the worker should be considered an employee 
for workmen's compensation purposes. 
See 726 P.2d at 430 n.2 (citations omitted). Here, plaintiff was 
integrally and quite continuously involved in defendant's business 
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in a manner where the cost of his accident cannot be readily 
channeled to the general populace* Affirming plaintiff's status as 
an employee does not violate the purposes of the Worker's 
Compensation Act, but rather furthers the same since it guarantees 
a remedy, if all other statutory pre-requisites are met, and 
assists in reducing litigation and meeting those public policy 
concerns upon which Utah's Worker's Compensation Act is based. 
Certainly an individual who meets the criteria that plaintiff has 
in this case for establishing his employee status should not be 
allowed to circumvent Utah's worker's compensation scheme when 
(1) plaintiff was paid remuneration, (2) plaintiff worked under 
defendant's direction, (3) plaintiff was subject to defendant's 
control, (4) the parties implicitly intended that an employment 
relationship exist, (5) plaintiff furthered defendant's business, 
(6) there was implicit agreement and consent by plaintiff to act as 
defendant's employee, (7) defendant had the right to hire and fire 
plaintiff, (8) defendant furnished plaintiff equipment and (9) 
defendant did not perform his employment services casually. This 
is not a situation, as plaintiff claims for the first time on 
appeal, of public policy being violated if plaintiff is limited to 
the provisions of Utah's Worker's Compensation Act. Instead, 
public policy mandates the trial court's conclusion in this case. 
Based upon all the factors enumerated by this Court and the 
legislature, plaintiff fits the status of defendant's employee, and 
the trial court correctly directed a verdict in defendant's favor 
in this respect. 
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II. 
PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS OF "VOLUNTEER" STATUS 
ARE MISLEADING AND WITHOUT MERIT. 
As noted above, the fact that plaintiff has emphasized his 
"volunteer worker" title is misleading and not determinative for 
purposes of the above evaluation under this Court's previous 
articulation of those factors governing employment relationships. 
There is no question that defendant's volunteer workers were 
treated as staff members and received benefits and regularly 
performed obligations under defendant's direct control and 
supervision. Further, even assuming that the "volunteer worker" 
title is somehow pertinent in this instance, other than being 
titled a "volunteer worker" there is no indication that plaintiff 
actually met the definition of a "volunteer" as recognized by well-
established law. 
Because determinations of "volunteer" status are closely tied 
to the facts of each case, sufficient reason exists not rely upon 
the "volunteer worker" issue as a basis for evaluating the trial 
court's decision below. Nevertheless, in addition to cases cited 
by plaintiff in his brief, all of which are either distinguishable 
or not controlling given the jurisdictions presented, this Court 
has already indicated that an employee status has existed in such 
cases where only meals, taxi fare, utilities, housing and milk were 
provided in exchange for services rendered. See Blake Stevens 
Construction, 697 P.2d at 231-32. Numerous other courts have also 
concluded that an employment relationship existed in cases 
analogous to that presently before the court. In Flamingo Motor 
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Inn v. Industrial Commission of Arizona, 133 Ariz. 200, 650 P.2d 
502 (Ct. App. 1982), that court, in applying a statutory workmen's 
compensation scheme that this Court has already decided "is almost 
identical to Utah's," see Pinter Construction, 678 P.2d at 309, 
ruled that an individual who assisted a restaurant owner with the 
moving and installation of kitchen equipment in exchange for a 
round of drinks was an employee of the restaurant owner within that 
state's Worker's Compensation Act. See Flamingo Motor Inn, 650 
P.2d at 503-05. Likewise, the Supreme Court of Arizona in Johnson 
v. Industrial Commission, 88 Arizona 354, 356 P.2d 1021 (1960) 
ruled that an incarcerated individual who was provided food, 
lodging, sundries, and cigarettes in exchange for work, was an 
employee of the establishment he assisted notwithstanding the fact 
that as a result of his work he received other compensation from 
another source in the form of reduction of his prison sentence. 
And the courts of Oregon have similarly concluded that an 
individual who received free boarding in exchange for services was 
an employee under that state's statutory scheme, see Scott v. State 
Accident Insurance Fund, 42 Or. App. 595, 600 P.2d 967 (1979); and 
teenage girls who received lunches, free use of riding horses and 
an occasional payment of a couple of dollars in exchange for 
performing chores at the riding academy were employees for purposes 
of that state's Worker's Compensation Act. Buckner v. Kennedy's 
Riding Academy, 526 P.2d 450 (Or. App. 1974). 
Accordingly, based upon the cases noted, and upon this Court's 
established analysis, it is clear that the trial court correctly 
ruled herein that an employment relationship existed and 
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plaintiff's remedies were therefore limited by the provisions of 
Utah's Worker's Compensation Act. 
III. 
ASSUMING THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN GRANTING 
A DIRECTED VERDICT FOR DEFENDANT, SUCH ERROR WAS HARMLESS. 
Based upon evidence presented at trial below the court 
correctly directed a verdict in defendant's favor on the basis that 
plaintiff was defendant's employee. Nevertheless, even if the 
court erred in directing its verdict, such error was harmless since 
(1) absent the error there is no reasonable likelihood of a more 
favorable result for the plaintiff; (2) if plaintiff was not deemed 
defendant's employee, he was a trespasser and defendant breached no 
applicable duty owed; and (3) plaintiff failed to raise below the 
arguments he now asserts on appeal. 
A. 
THE EVIDENCE DEMONSTRATED THAT IF PLAINTIFF WAS NOT 
DEFENDANT'S EMPLOYEE PLAINTIFF WAS A TRESPASSER TO 
WHOM NO APPLICABLE DUTY WAS BREACHED. 
As noted in Point I above, plaintiff attempted since the 
initiation of this lawsuit to present evidence that he was working 
for defendant at the time of the injury and thus should be entitled 
to compensation therefore. Only when defendant argued the defense 
that plaintiff's claims were limited by Utah worker's compensation 
scheme did plaintiff "back pedal" from his sole theory of recovery. 
By that time, the majority of evidence presented unequivocally 
supported the trial court's conclusion that plaintiff was 
defendant's employee at the time of his injury. In fact, the only 
significant evidence not supportive of this conclusion demonstrates 
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that if plaintiff was not defendant's employee at the time of his 
injury he was a trespasser to defendant and was not injured by 
defendant's breach of any duty owed a trespasser.4 
Although plaintiff expressly acknowledges in his brief that he 
"was acting under the direction and control of [defendant] when he 
was injured" (see plaintiff's brief at 8) at the same time he 
wishes this Court to acknowledge that he was not a trespasser, 
licensee, invitee or employee of defendant, but rather fell within 
an invented "gratuitous servant" category not recognized under Utah 
law. While this novel argument was not raised below and should 
thus not be considered now on appeal (see Point III B, infra), the 
evidence presented clearly demonstrates that if plaintiff was not 
defendant's employee at the time of his injury he was a trespasser 
to defendant and was owed no duty by defendant except to avoid 
willfully and intentionally injuring plaintiff. As this Court has 
repeatedly held, "a property owner's duty to a person injured on 
his property is determined by that person's status on that property 
as a "invitee," a "licensee," or a "trespasser."" Pratt v. 
Mitchell Hollow Irrigation Company. 813 P.2d 1169 (Utah 1991) 
(citing Tias v. Proctor, 591 P.2d 438, 441 (Utah 1979); Restatement 
(Second) of Torts §§ 329-43 (1967)). And a "land owner owes no 
duty to a trespasser, except to refrain from causing willful and 
wanton injury to him or her." Weber v. Springville City, 725 P.2d 
4Facts supporting plaintiff's trespasser status include the 
testimony that he never filled out an application, he operated 
power equipment in violation of defendant's policy and he was not 
considered a staff member by defendant's president. (R. 1092 at 
368-74.) 
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1360 (Utah 1986). This Court has also ruled that those entering 
upon the land of another with what is believed to be an implied 
invitation to visit the premises or for the mutual advantage of the 
property owner do not necessarily hold the status of "invitees" but 
may be trespassers under the law. See, e.g., Jones v. Horman's 
Inc., 15 Utah 2d 188, 389 P.2d 738 (1964). In that case, the 
plaintiff's husband had been told that he might be offered work by 
the defendant at some time in the future. The plaintiff was 
injured while accompanying her husband to the defendant's premises 
to view the work site; and she claimed that she held the status of 
an invitee by reason of an implied invitation she believed her 
husband had received to visit the defendant's premises. This 
Court, however, denied that argument outright and ruled that both 
plaintiff and her husband were trespassers under the circumstances 
given the lack of an invitation and the unreasonable hour. See 398 
P.2d at 739. 
Similarly, other courts have ruled that "to one who is a 
volunteer, . . . even if assisting in the master's work at the 
request of a servant, no affirmative duty to exercise care is due 
originally, but only after knowledge of peril." Bogart v. Hester, 
347 P.2d 327, 331 (N.M. 1959) (citation omitted). In Bogart, the 
plaintiff was visiting his uncle's place of employment to borrow a 
tool and was injured when he volunteered to assist his uncle in 
loading a tank. That court held that summary judgment was 
appropriately granted the defendant even if the plaintiff was not 
considered a trespasser since his status as a "volunteer" did not 
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entitle him to recover from the defendant employer because as noted 
elsewhere: 
[t]he defendant had no knowledge of the situation which 
arose, and could not well have anticipated what happened. 
The servant, by invitation or by acceptance of volunteer 
assistance, could impose no new or greater obligation on 
the master than that which the master owed to him. Nor 
could the invitee or volunteer create a new or greater 
liability by his act. The authorities sustain the 
principle of non-liability under such circumstances. 
See id. at 329-30 (citation omitted). In ruling as such, the court 
cited numerous opinions from other jurisdictions referencing that 
when plaintiffs volunteer to assist employers at the request of one 
of the employer's employees, the only obligation resting upon the 
employer is to refrain from any wanton or willful act producing 
injury. See id. at 330-32. This Court should utilize this 
standard here. 
Given plaintiffs own claims in this case that he was working 
for defendant he must be presumed to have either been an employee 
or a trespasser of defendant. If he was an employee of defendant 
his remedies are limited by Utah worker's compensation law. On the 
other hand, if plaintiff was a trespasser to defendant, defendant 
owed no duty other than to avoid willfully and wantonly injuring 
plaintiff. And since there is no evidence that defendant willfully 
or wantonly injured plaintiff, any error in directing a verdict in 
defendant's favor on the employment issue was harmless. 
Accordingly, the trial court's verdict below should be sustained on 
appeal. 
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B. 
SINCE PLAINTIFF FAILED TO RAISE BELOW HIS 
"GRATUITOUS SERVANT" AND PUBLIC POLICY ARGUMENTSf 
SUCH ARGUMENTS SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED ON APPEAL. 
This Court has long upheld the rule that it will generally 
refuse to consider issues not presented to the trial court below. 
See Zions First National Bank v. National American Title Insurance, 
749 P.2d 651, 654 (Utah 1988) (and cases cited therein). In that 
case, the appellant had argued that there was no "sound policy 
reason" for this Court not considering the issue first raised on 
appeal since the issue was arguably a legal question. However, 
this Court ruled: 
[Appellant's] position ignores one of the reasons 
for refusing to consider any matter for the first time on 
appeal, even a matter of law. Although we may not defer 
to a trial court's conclusions on a legal question, we 
certainly may derive great benefit from the trial judge's 
views on the issue and may be persuaded by those views. 
This provides ample justification for refusing to 
consider [appellant's] claim. 
Id. at 654. And this Court also noted that the issue in any event 
involved "a question of fact which may not be determined on 
appeal." Id. 
Further, in Allisen v. American Legion Post 134, 763 P.2d 806 
(Utah 1988) this Court likewise concluded that it would not 
consider a theory of recovery raised on appeal where a different 
theory was alleged under the complaint and the trial court had 
limited its ruling to the theory raised in the plaintiff's 
complaint. See id. at 807-809. Applying these rules of law and 
sound legal reasoning to the facts of this case demonstrates the 
soundness of this Court not considering plaintiff's arguments 
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raised for the first time on appeal concerning his desired 
"gratuitous servant" status and claimed public policy violations of 
Utah's worker's compensation scheme. 
As noted above and as referenced by a plain reading of the 
record below, since the filing of this complaint, plaintiff's sole 
theory of recovery was based upon the argument that he was injured 
while acting as a volunteer worker for defendant. Notwithstanding 
the fact that defendant asserted in its answer that plaintiff's 
claims were limited by application of Utah's Worker's Compensation 
Act, plaintiff did not address this possibility and never argued or 
pursued other theories of recovery below. It wasn't until 
defendant made its arguments for a directed verdict on the ground 
that plaintiff's claims were limited by the Worker's Compensation 
Act that plaintiff began to "back pedal" away from his employee 
theory and urge the court to not adopt such a view. Yet, even as 
part of plaintiff's argument below, plaintiff never raised his 
"gratuitous servant" argument invented for appeal as a basis for 
this Court to conclude that the Worker's Compensation Act did not 
apply to him. Further, plaintiff did not argue below the public 
policy claims he now urges on appeal (see plaintiff's brief at 37). 
Certainly, this Court would have been aided by the trial 
court's decision below regarding plaintiff's novel and unrecognized 
allegations that plaintiff should be viewed as a "gratuitous 
servant" under the arguments set forth for the first time in 
plaintiff's appellate brief. (See plaintiff's brief at pp. 20-28; 
Zions, 749 P.2d at 654.) Further, the issue as to whether 
plaintiff could be a "gratuitous servant," assuming this invented 
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status was recognized in Utah, is a factual question; and the trial 
court should have been afforded an opportunity to consider the same 
if plaintiff wanted to raise and pursue this claim on appeal. 
Likewise, this Court would have been well served by arguments, 
analyses, evidence and conclusions presented to or made by the 
trial court involving plaintiff's novel argument that "public 
policy intentionally precludes volunteers from worker's act 
coverage." (See plaintiff's brief at 29-38.) 
In short, plaintiff should not be benefitted by his failure to 
raise arguments below which he now wishes to address on appeal. A 
plain reading of the complaint will demonstrate that such claims 
have not been properly raised or significantly argued below to 
obtain the trial court's consideration thereof prior to this 
Court's review on appeal.5 
IV. 
EVEN IF PLAINTIFF'S NOVEL ARGUMENTS ARE CONSIDERED 
FOR THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT 
ERR IN DIRECTING ITS VERDICT. 
Notwithstanding the fact that this Court should not review 
plaintiff's "gratuitous servant" and public policy arguments raised 
for the first time on appeal, even if the Court chooses to do so, 
5Although this Court should not review defendant's public 
policy allegations raised for the first time on appeal, such 
allegations nevertheless lack foundation since plaintiff elicited 
no evidence from the Industrial Commission or others that the 
trial court's decision regarding plaintiff's employee status 
would have a "profound effect" on charitable organizations in the 
state of Utah, as he now claims in his brief. And plaintiff's 
plea for the court to take "judicial notice" of such facts was 
not previously raised. 
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it should conclude that the trial court did not err in directing a 
verdict in this case based upon correct applications of law. 
Plaintiff's invented "gratuitous servant" theory of recovery 
is not recognized by Utah's Worker's Compensation Act. And this 
Court has previously expressed its refusal to judicially expand 
Utah's worker's compensation statutes. Indeed, in Board of 
Education of Alpine School District v. Olsen, 684 P.2d 49, this 
Court considered the argument that the administrative law judge had 
incorrectly concluded that provisions of Utah's worker's 
compensation scheme evidenced the Legislature's intent to extend 
worker's compensation benefits to "volunteers who were injured 
during the course and scope of their voluntary labor." See id. at 
51. Therein, this Court ruled that "to extrapolate from . . . 
particular provisions of [Utah's Worker's Compensation Act] that 
all volunteers are eligible for worker's compensation is beyond the 
scope of the commission's authority or ours" since "Utah's Worker's 
Compensation Scheme is a purely statutory creation. rAndl ftlhis 
court cannot expand the statute to subjects not included in its 
provisions." Id. at 51 (some emphasis added).6 Just as in Olsen, 
this Court has no basis upon which to expand the statutory scheme 
created by Utah's Legislature. Nowhere in Utah's Worker's 
Compensation Act is a "gratuitous servant" status recognized and/or 
6Importantly, although the Court was not willing in that 
case to hold that the volunteer was entitled to worker's 
compensation benefits, it based its holding therein upon the 
employee/employer analysis referenced above. Accordingly, even 
though plcLintiff has titled himself defendant's "voluntary 
worker," such a title is irrelevant since application of the 
employer/employee analysis in Point I demonstrates the existence 
of an employment relationship. 
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defined. And any change in the statutory scheme is for Utah's 
legislature and not this Court to make. 
In addition, the cases plaintiff cites in urging this Court to 
judicially legislate and adopt his "gratuitous servant" argument 
are distinguishable or inapposite. Many involve different 
statutory schemes or factual situations where the employee 
performed purely contributory effort without receiving any 
remuneration. See, e.g., Edwards v. Hollywood Canteen, 160 P.2d 94 
(Cal. App. 1945), vacated, 167 P.2d 729 (1946) (plaintiff performed 
contribution to war effort where statute required payment to be 
considered an employee); Fernguist v. San Francisco Presbetery, 313 
P.2d 192 (Cal. App. 1957) (no benefit received and no pledge 
offered); Ferrell v. Industrial Commission of Arizona, 288 P.2d 492 
(Ariz. 1955) (no compensation awarded and plaintiff performed 
services only as patriotic citizen). Other cases cited by 
plaintiff are distinguishable given the applicable statutes. See, 
e.g., Ferrol v. Liapold Sinsheimer Estate, 176 N.E. 817 (N.Y. 1931) 
(wages not paid and gratuities are not compensation) ; Harris v. 
Seiavitch, 9 A.2d 375 (Pa. 1939) (plaintiff allowed to bring action 
in trespass); Jelso v. World Balloon Corp., 637 P.2d 846 (N.M. App. 
1981) (statute required that employees earn money; and there was a 
no remuneration policy in effect); Frederick v. Mens Reformatory, 
203 N.W.2d 797 (Iowa 1973) (by statutory definition prisoners did 
not perform voluntary service); Rensing v. Indiana State 
University, 444 N.E.2d 1170 (Ind. 1983) (scholarships were not 
remuneration under the statute). Such cases are in direct contrast 
to the facts of this case. 
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Also, although plaintiff cites small portions of Professor 
Larson's treatise on worker's compensation to support his 
allegation that the "gratuitous servant" category might be 
acknowledged in some states, Professor Larson does not actually 
recognize the clear independence of such a status although he 
summarily defines gratuitous servants thusly: "gratuitous 
employees are not employees, since the element of "hiring" is 
lacking; but payment may be found in anything of value, such as 
boarding and lodging, and an agreement to pay is usually implied 
when the parties have admitted to make an express agreement on 
payment." See Larson, Workmen's Compensation Law § 47, at 8-284 
(emphasis added). Further, Professor Larson notes that individuals 
cannot be gratuitous servants if there exists some form of payment, 
even if the payment does not come from the employer or necessarily 
go to the employee. See id. § 47.41, at 8-328. And given the 
facts above, even if this Court were to conclude that such a status 
could exist absent statutory recognition, it is clear that 
plaintiff was not a gratuitous servant since plaintiff received 
compensation for services rendered in the form of valuable theater 
tickets, other discounts and actual cash wages, which wages under 
Professor Larson's view need not have come from plaintiff's 
employer but could have come from plaintiff's father as the 
testimony evidenced. Thus, even under plaintiff's treatise claims 
a gratuitous servant relationship did not exist. 
Finally, numerous other cases conclude under comparable facts 
that a "gratuitous servant" relationship cannot exist. See, e.g., 
Barragan v. Worker's Compensation Appeals Board, 240 Cal. Rptr. 
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811, 820 (Cal. App. 1987) (worker who acquired instruction and 
training designed to teach him skills received remuneration within 
meaning of Worker's Compensation Act since "definition of 
remuneration that is found in various dictionaries is not limited 
to cash payment," but includes "reward, recompense, salary, or 
compensation"); Barber v. Rich's, Inc., 90 S.E.2d 666, 669 (Ga. Ct. 
App. 1955) (customer who assisted in obtaining tool at request of 
defendant's employee was not servant or invitee and could not 
recover for injuries since one who "voluntarily undertakes to 
perform service for a master is a mere volunteer, and the master 
does not owe him any duty, except not to injure him willfully and 
wantonly after his peril is discovered"); Shea v. Gurnev, 39 N.E. 
996, 997 (Mass. 1895) (14 year old plaintiff who visited place of 
employment to amuse himself by assisting defendant's employees and 
received injuries could not recover from defendant employer since 
defendant owed plaintiff "no duty, except to abstain from injuring 
him by active misconduct"); Duschnik v. Deco Restaurants, 276 N.Y. 
439, 12 N.E.2d 536 (1983) (employer not liable for injuries caused 
by volunteer who came to work to help employee and used employer's 
machine furnished for use of employees). And in Lawson v. Lawson, 
415 S.W.2d 313 (Mo. 1967) that court noted that when the employer 
father paid no wages or regular compensation to the son and the son 
received only his regular allowance, an employee relationship 
nevertheless existed between the father and son since 
even as the master-servant relationship may exist 
notwithstanding the fact that the servant neither expects 
nor is entitled to receive any compensation, so payment 
of wages or compensation, although usually incident to an 
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employer/employee relationship, is not always an 
essential element thereof. 
All of this is not to suggest that, in the 
performance of every trivial or occasional act of 
assistance by a minor child in connection with a parent's 
business operation, such child becomes an "employee" 
within the contemplation and coverage of the Compensation 
Law. But the uncontradicted and unimpeached testimony in 
this case was to the effect that, although [the infant] 
did not work every day, he nevertheless made a hand as a 
workman in his father's business, so that, after his 
accident, he was "replaced" by another male workman who 
was paid [to do the work] . . . ; that claimant was "in 
the service of" his father, i.e. he was engaged in the 
"performance of labor for [his father's] benefit." and 
that such service was both controllable and controlled by 
the father. 
Id. at 318-19 (citations omitted). 
In this case, plaintiff was not a gratuitous servant even if 
this Court were to acknowledge that such a status can exist in Utah 
without support in statute. Plaintiff received compensation for 
his services and benefitted defendant thereby. In fact, as noted 
in the record, but for the directions of plaintiff's father 
defendant would have filed an employee injury application for 
plaintiff with the Utah Industrial Commission. Plaintiff's father 
and plaintiff himself acknowledged that plaintiff had received 
compensation, that in his capacity as defendant's manager 
plaintiff's father supervised plaintiff and that plaintiff 
regularly performed work for defendant, which work had to be 
performed by defendant's other employees after plaintiff was 
injured. 
Since Utah law does not recognize a "gratuitous servant" 
status in this case, and since plaintiff failed to raise this 
argument below, this Court should not follow plaintiff's urgings 
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and adopt a "gratuitous servant" status where none otherwise exists 
in the law. 
CONCLUSION 
Given the evidence before this Court and that presented at 
trial below, there is no reasonable basis upon which to support a 
judgment in plaintiff's favor and thus the trial court's directed 
verdict must be sustained given (1) an analysis of Utah's worker's 
compensation scheme to the facts of this case, (2) the issues 
plaintiff raised below, and (3) even those issues plaintiff raises 
for the first time on appeal. 
Respectfully submitted this '' day of September, 1991. 
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APPENDIX A 
Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-42 (Supp. 1985). 
35-1-42. Employers enumerated and defined— 
Regularly employed—Independent contractors. The 
following shall constitute employers subject to the 
provisions of this title: 
(2) Every person, firm and private corporation, 
including every public utility, having in service one or 
more workmen or operatives regularly employed in the same 
business, or in or about the same establishment, under 
any contract of hire, express or implied, oral or written 
• • . • 
The term "regularly" as herein used shall include 
all employments in the usual course of the trade, 
business, profession or occupation of the employer, 
whether continuous throughout the year or for only a 
portion of the year. 
Where any employer procures any work to be done 
wholly or in part for him by a contractor over whose work 
he retains supervision or control, and such work is a 
part or process in the trade or business of the employer, 
such contractor, and all persons employed by him, and all 
subcontractors under him, and all persons employed by any 
such subcontractors, shall be deemed, within the meaning 
of this section, employees of such original employer. 
Any person, firm or corporation engaged in the 
performance of work as an independent contractor shall be 
deemed an employer within the meaning of this section. 
The term "independent contractor," as herein used, is 
defined to be any person, association or corporation 
engaged in the performance of any work for another, who, 
while so engaged, is independent of the employer in all 
that pertains to the execution of the work, is not 
subject to the rule or control of the employer, is 
engaged only in the performance of a definite job or 
piece of work, and is subordinate to the employer only in 
effecting a result in accordance with the employer's 
design. 
Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-43 (Supp. 1985). 
35-1-43. "Employee," "workmen," and "operative" 
defined—Mining lessees and sublessees—Partners and sole 
proprietors—Real estate agent or broker. (1) The words 
"employee," "workmen," and "operative," as used in this 
chapter, mean: 
(b) every person in the service of any employer as 
defined in Subsection 35-1-42(2), who employs one or more 
workers or operatives regularly in the same business, or 
in or about the same establishment, under any contract of 
hire, express or implied, oral or written, including 
aliens, and minors whether legally or illegally working 
for hire, but not including any person whose employment 
is casual and not in the usual course of trade, business, 
or occupation of his employer. 
Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-60. 
35-1-60. Exclusive remedy against employer, or 
officer, agent or employee—Occupational disease 
excepted. 
The right to recover compensation pursuant to the 
provisions of this title for injuries sustained by an 
employee, whether resulting in death or not, shall be the 
exclusive remedy against the employer and shall be the 
exclusive remedy against any officer, agent or employee 
of the employer and the liabilities of the employer 
imposed by this act shall be in place of any and all 
other civil liability whatsoever, at common law or 
otherwise, to such employee or to his spouse, widow, 
children, parents, dependents, next of kin, heirs, 
personal representatives, guardian, or any other person 
whomsoever, on account of any accident or injury or 
death, in any way contracted, sustained, aggravated or 
incurred by such employee in the course of or because of 
or arising out of his employment, and no action at law 
may be maintained against an employer or against any 
officer, agent or employee of the employer based upon any 
accident, injury or death of an employee. Nothing in 
this section, however, shall prevent an employee (or his 
dependents) from filing a claim with the industrial 
commission of Utah for compensation in those cases within 
the provisions of the Utah Occupational Disease 
Disability Act, as amended. 
